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Executive Summary 
 
This report provides an overview of labor rights in Colombia in response to the 
requirement of the Trade Act of 2002 that the President provide a “meaningful labor 
rights report” concerning each country with which a free trade agreement is under 
consideration.  The report focuses on important changes that have occurred in recent 
years, identifies ongoing issues, and discusses the commitments made by the Government 
of Colombia and the actions it has already taken under the “Colombian Action Plan 
related to Labor Rights” (“Action Plan”).  The Action Plan was announced on April 7, 
2011, by President Barack Obama and President Juan Manuel Santos.  The Action Plan 
sets out the specific steps the Government of Colombia has committed to take to address 
concerns regarding Colombian labor laws and practices and the protection of labor rights.    
 
This report is divided into three sections.  Section One provides an introduction to the 
report.  Section Two identifies “Issues of Note,” which are areas of concern with regard 
to labor laws and practices, and notes changes made by the Government of Colombia 
during recent years.  The section also describes the Colombian Action Plan, which 
includes a broad range of initiatives to address these areas of concern.   
 
Among the significant changes, Colombia has committed or has already taken steps to:  
 
 Re-establish a separate Ministry of Labor and double the number of labor 
inspectors to enhance enforcement efforts;  
 
 Accelerate and strengthen reforms to combat the misuse of associated worker 
cooperatives to deny workers their rights under Colombian law; and 
 
 Establish criminal penalties for employers who undermine the right to organize 
and bargain collectively, including through collective pacts.  
While Colombia has taken substantial steps to improve protection of worker rights, the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) continues to express concerns in several areas.  
This report notes those concerns, referencing in each instance the relevant jurisprudence 
and recommendations from the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations and the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association.   
As part of the Action Plan, the Government of Colombia has requested the assistance of 
the ILO to facilitate the implementation of the steps in that plan related to Colombia’s 
labor law.  The ILO was also asked to facilitate a Tripartite Process, bringing together the 
Government, employers and trade unions, with the goal of ensuring the full protection of 
labor rights and compliance with labor laws.  
 
In light of the history of violence against trade unionists in Colombia, Section Three, 
“Labor Violence and Impunity,” describes progress and remaining challenges in 
combating ongoing violence and intimidation of labor activists.  The report notes that the 
Action Plan includes improvements to a protection program to shield trade unionists from 
 4 
violence and a separate program to protect teachers, as teachers have been particular 
targets of violence.  The section also describes the detailed steps included in the Action 
Plan to prosecute anti-trade union crimes.  
 
Overall, this report finds that, while violence against trade unionists and the abuse of 
workers’ rights remain significant challenges, the Government of Colombia’s recent and 
proposed reforms on these issues demonstrate a strong and comprehensive commitment 
to protect workers’ rights, to ensure that trade union activists can exercise their 
fundamental rights without fear of retaliation and that those who commit violence against 
trade unionists will be prosecuted.   
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1.  Introduction 
This report on labor rights in Colombia has been prepared pursuant to section 2102(c)(8) 
of the Trade Act of 2002 (“Trade Act”) (Pub. L. No. 107-210).  The Trade Act provides 
that the President shall: 
[i]n connection with any trade negotiations entered into under this Act, 
submit to the Committee of Ways and Means of the House of 
Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate a meaningful 
labor rights report of the country, or countries, with respect to which the 
President is negotiating. 
The President, by Executive Order 13277 (67 Fed. Reg. 70305 (Nov. 21, 2002)), assigned 
the above responsibilities to the Secretary of Labor and provided that they be carried out 
in consultation with the Secretary of State and the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR).  
The Secretary of Labor subsequently provided that such responsibilities would be carried 
out by the Secretary of State, the USTR, and the Secretary of Labor (67 Fed. Reg. 77812 
(Dec. 19, 2002)).      
 
This report examines the current situation and highlights the most important recent 
changes.  For the purposes of this report, labor rights are identified as internationally 
recognized labor rights contained in the definition of “labor laws” under Chapter 17, the 
Labor Chapter of the Colombia TPA.
1
  These rights are: 
 
a. freedom of association; 
b. the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; 
c. the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor; 
d. the effective abolition of child labor, a prohibition on the worst forms of child 
labor, and other labor protections for children and minors; 
e. the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation; 
and  
f. acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, 
and occupational safety and health. 
 
This report does not attempt a comprehensive review of labor laws and practices, but 
rather draws attention to important developments of recent years.  It identifies ongoing 
issues and discusses the Government of Colombia’s Action Plan commitments to take 
specific steps needed to bring Colombian labor laws and practices into greater conformity 
with internationally recognized labor rights.  The Action Plan was announced on April 7, 
2011 by President Barack Obama and President Juan Manuel Santos.
2
    
 
                                                 
1
 United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (Colombia TPA), Article 17.8, 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/colombia/asset_upload_file993_10146.pdf 
2
 The Action Plan is available at: http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2787. 
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The second section of this report, “Issues of Note,” identifies areas of concern and notes 
recent changes to related law and practice made by the Government of Colombia.  These 
notable areas include: Associated Work Cooperatives, Collective Pacts, Prohibitions on 
the Right to Strike, Temporary Service Agencies, Freedom of Association and Collective 
Bargaining, the reconstitution of the Ministry of Labor in Colombia and several other 
significant developments on labor rights.  For each area, this section details related 
specific steps included in the Action Plan.  The third section of the report focuses on 
remaining challenges and progress made in combating violence against Colombian trade 
unionists and efforts to prosecute the perpetrators.  The report notes the steps in the 
Action Plan to improve protections from violence for trade unionists and to prosecute 
anti-trade union crimes.  
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2.  Issues of Note 
 
This section discusses issues of concern identified by the U.S. Government and by the 
ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 
(CEACR), the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) and labor rights 
groups.  The section describes recent labor reforms carried out by the Government of 
Colombia and the commitments that the Government of Colombia has made and is in the 
process of undertaking as part of the Action Plan to address remaining concerns.   
 
The Action Plan provides mechanisms for oversight by the two governments as the plan 
is implemented.  In addition, the Government of Colombia has launched a Tripartite 
Process with trade unions and employers to work on implementation of the Plan and 
promote improved and effective social dialogue on labor issues.  The Government has 
also requested the ILO to provide technical assistance to help in the implementation of 
the Action Plan and to foster the Tripartite Process, with the goal of ensuring full 
protection of labor rights and compliance with labor laws.   
2.1  Associated Work Cooperatives  
 
Colombian law allows for workers to join together in self-governed, autonomous 
enterprises known as Associated Work Cooperatives (Cooperativos de Trabajo Asociado 
- CTAs).  Several Colombian laws contain provisions and operating criteria intended to 
ensure that CTAs are democratically controlled and are not misused to avoid direct 
employment relationships.
3
  Until late 2010, penalties for violating such provisions and 
criteria were enforced only against violating CTAs, rather than the third-party employers 
who benefited from the prohibited practices.  The ILO also considered that enforcement 
of the existing laws was inadequate.
4
  
 
As a result, CTAs became a vehicle widely used by employers to end direct employment 
relationships with their workforces, while retaining the same or other workers through 
                                                 
3
 Government of Colombia, Por la cual se actualiza la Legislación Cooperativa, Ley 79 de 1988, as 
published in Diario Oficial, no. 38,648 (January 10, 1989) [hereinafter Ley 79], Article 59; available from 
ftp://ftp.camara.gov.co/camara/basedoc/ley/1988/ley_0079_1988.html. See also Government of Colombia, 
Por el cual se reglamenta la organización y funcionamiento de las Cooperativas y Precooperativas de 
Trabajo Asociado, Decreto Número 4588 de 2006, as published in Diario Oficial no. 46,494 (December 
27, 2006)[hereinafter Decreto 4588], Articles 4 and 5; available from 
http://www.dnp.gov.co/PortalWeb/Portals/0/archivos/documentos/DDS/Empleo_Segudidad_Social/Decret
o%20No.4588%20de%202006.pdf. See also  Government of Colombia, Por medio de la cual se precisan 
los elementos estructurales de las contribuciones a la seguridad social, Ley 1233 de 2008, as published in 
Diario Oficial, no. 47,058 (July 22, 2008) [hereinafter Ley 1233], Article 12; available from 
http://www.alcaldiabogota.gov.co/sisjur/normas/Norma1.jsp?i=31586.  
4
 See International Labor Conference, 2011 Report of the CEACR, 518; available from 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_151556.pdf. 
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CTAs and continuing to act as their de facto employers,
5
 for example by engaging in 
prohibited practices to control the workers’ schedules, assign duties, determine terms and 
conditions of employment and make personnel decisions.
6
  As members of cooperatives, 
the workers are vulnerable to exploitation because CTA members are considered 
cooperative “owners,” rather than workers, and are thus excluded from many Labor Code 
protections.
7
  This status also denies workers the right to form unions and bargain with 
their de facto employers.  The ILO has consistently asked the Government of Colombia 
to reform laws and improve enforcement in order to end misuse of CTAs to impede 
workers’ rights to associate and bargain collectively.8  
 
Existing Laws and Practice Governing Cooperatives:  Under Colombian law, a 
minimum of 10 workers is required to form a CTA.
9
  Laws governing CTAs also provide 
that CTA operations must ensure democratic participation of members and establish an 
internal governance structure and that CTA leaders and officers must be independently 
elected.
10
  The laws also require that a CTA own, possess or control its means of 
production.
11
  Legislation governing CTAs bans the associations from engaging in “labor 
intermediation,”12 prohibits cooperatives from acting as temporary service agencies and 
requires compliance with a range of specifically articulated criteria for CTA operation.
13
  
Since 2008, Colombian law has extended to CTA members the Labor Code guarantees 
governing minimum wage and social security, including health care, pensions, and 
workers’ compensation.14    
 
Under Colombian law, third-party employers are prohibited from interfering in the 
operation or organization of cooperatives.
15
  When a third-party employer engages a CTA 
for labor intermediation or as a temporary service agency, that employer is jointly liable 
for the economic obligations owed to the CTA associates and the CTA’s legal 
authorization to operate can be revoked.  When a third-party employer illegally assumes 
control of internal CTA governance and discipline, the affected associates may be 
considered direct employees of that employer under the law.
16
   
                                                 
5
 Stefano Farné, “Las cooperativas de trabajo asociado en Colombia: balance de la política gubernamental 
2002-2007,” Revista de Economía Institucional, vol. 10, issue 18 (2008), pp. 263, 266-67, and 269; 
available from http://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=2667581. 
6
 Farné, “Las cooperativas de trabajo asociado en Colombia.” 270.  See also Escuela Nacional Sindical 
(ENS), Maneras y atajos de las Cooperativas de Trabajo Asociado para precarizar condiciones laborales, 
December 15, 2010, pp. 3, 5, and 7; available from http://www.ens.org.co/index.shtml?apc=Na--;2;-;-
;&x=20166252.  
7
 Decreto 4588, Article 10. 
8
 Conclusions of the High Level Tripartite Mission to Colombia, February 14-18, 2011, p. 4, available from 
http://www.cut.org.co/images/stories/file/Document.pdf. 
9
 Decreto 4588, Article 4.  
10
 Ley 79, Articles 5, 19, 29, 30, and 71. 
11
 Decreto 4588, Article 8. 
12
 “Labor intermediation” is understood as the practice of serving as a de facto employment agency to send 
workers to perform labor services to third-party employers rather than as independent member-owned 
businesses. 
13
 Decreto 4588, Article 17.  See also Ley 1233, Articles 7.1 and 7.3 
14
 Ley 1233, Articles 3 and 6. 
15
 Decreto 4588, Article 18 
16
 Decreto 4588, Articles 16 and 17; Ley 1233, Articles 7.3 and 7.4. 
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Cooperatives are also legally understood to include “pre-cooperatives,” which have 
similar characteristics as cooperatives but are meant to be transitional, operating for only 
five years with possible extensions and requiring only five members instead of ten.  By 
law, a pre-cooperative, unlike a cooperative, must have a sponsor that provides financial 
and technical support and training and participates in its administration and control.
17
  
These requirements create the potential for the establishment of employer-dominated pre-
cooperatives, since the “sponsors” are typically employers who then hire the members of 
the pre-cooperative.  Pre-cooperative members are thus more vulnerable than cooperative 
members to being denied their rights under labor law, including their ability to form 
unions.  There are presently 341 pre-cooperatives authorized and registered.
18
   
 
The use of CTAs has increased dramatically over the last decade,
19
 with growth 
particularly pronounced in the sugar, palm oil and port sectors.
20
  For example, the 
Colombian Sugar Industry Association, ASOCAÑA, estimates that nearly 70 percent of 
its cane cutters nationwide are now members of CTAs.
21
  FEDEPALMA, the Colombian 
Palm Oil Association, estimates that about 35 percent of its palm workers are employed 
through cooperatives.
22
  According to the Ministry of Social Protection (MSP) there are 
currently 4,555 CTAs in Colombia.
23
 
 
Because CTA members are considered joint owners of the cooperative, rather than 
workers, and their right to organize is thus not protected under law, violations of freedom 
of association have been prevalent in sectors where CTA use is widespread.
24
  In the 
palm oil sector, for instance, some employers reportedly assign their managerial 
personnel to run the CTA board elections and set limits on the total number of CTA 
associates in order to maintain control, including for the purpose of avoiding unions. 
25
  
Similar practices are reported in the port and sugar sectors.
26
 
 
A recent ILO High Level Tripartite Mission to Colombia concluded that CTAs had 
contributed significantly to the drastic reduction in Colombian trade union density,
27
 
                                                 
17
 Ley 79, Articles 124-129. 
18
 E-mail from MSP Official to U.S. Embassy-Bogotá, April 11, 2011 
19
 Farné, “Las cooperativas de trabajo asociado en Colombia,” p. 265.   
20
 Farné “Las cooperativas de trabajo asociado en Colombia,” p. 270.  See also ENS, Maneras y atajos de 
las Cooperativas de Trabajo Asociado para precarizar condiciones laborales, pp. 1, 3, 5, 7, and 10.  
21
 ASOCAÑA notes that 6,967 cane cutters out of a total of 10,997 workers belong to CTAs. ASOCAÑA, 
“The Colombian Sugar Sector is committed to Human Rights and Sustainable Development,” [document 
delivered to US officials Feb. 2011].  Other researchers have found that in the Valle del Cauca alone, there 
are approximately 10,000 CTA members working in the sugar industry. See Perez Rincon and Alvarez 
Roa, Deuda social y ambiental del negocio de la caña de azúcar en Colombia (Bogotá: Grupo Semillas, 
2009), 45; available from http://www.semillas.org.co/sitio.shtml?apc=I1---&x=20156449.  
22
 Communication from FEDEPALMA to US Embassy-Bogotá, February, 2011.  
23
 Email from MSP Official to US Embassy-Bogotá, April 11, 2011. 
 
24
 See ENS, Maneras y atajos de las Cooperativas de Trabajo Asociado para precarizar condiciones 
laborales, p. 2.  
25
 Ibid., pp. 5 and 7 
26
 Ibid., pp. 3, 7, and 8. 
27
 Conclusions of the ILO High Level Tripartite Mission to Colombia, February 14-18 2011, p. 4. 
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currently estimated at 4.4 percent of the labor force.
28
  The ILO Mission called for 
“renewed legislative and enforcement measures to put an end to the labor intermediary 
activities of cooperatives (CTAs), and all other legal and practical obstacles to freedom of 
association and collective bargaining.”29   
 
The Colombian Government, under President Juan Manuel Santos, shares concerns about 
the misuse of cooperatives.
30
  In response to the growing use of cooperatives to 
undermine workers’ rights, the Santos Administration proposed reforms to the laws 
governing cooperatives and in 2010 the Colombian Congress adopted Law 1429, the 
“Law on Formalization and Generation of Employment.”  Article 63 of the law prohibits 
private and public employers from using cooperatives to act as labor intermediaries to 
provide labor for “permanent core functions” of the user employer.  Article 63 also 
prohibits misuse by the user employer of any other kind of labor relationship that affects 
workers’ constitutional or labor law rights to carry out “permanent core functions.”  For 
the first time, the law establishes significant fines (up to 5,000 monthly minimum wages, 
equal to approximately U.S. $1.4 million) for user employers as well as CTAs that violate 
the prohibitions.  A CTA implicated in the violation of Article 63 is subject to dissolution 
and liquidation under the law.
31
   
 
Action Plan:  When adopted in December 2010, Article 63 was scheduled to enter into 
force on July 1, 2013.  However the Santos Administration introduced legislation to 
accelerate the effective date, which the Colombian Congress approved on April 26, 2011.  
All provisions of Article 63 took immediate effect upon the signature of President Santos 
on June 16, 2011. 
 
Meeting its commitment under the Action Plan, the Government of Colombia issued 
regulations to implement Article 63 on June 8, 2011.  As set out in the Action Plan, the 
regulations contain clear and sufficiently broad definitions of “permanent core function” 
and “labor intermediation” to adequately address CTA abuses.  The regulations also 
clarify earlier cooperatives laws and ensure coherence among these laws and the new 
provisions.  In order to promote compliance, the regulations allow for the adjustment of 
fines where an employer agrees to create and maintain a direct employment relationship 
with the affected workers.  Fines are set higher for repeat offenders and large-scale 
violators.  The Government has committed to strictly apply and enforce legal 
requirements that only cooperatives that are autonomous, exhibit financial independence 
and own their methods of production, capital and assets will be permitted to operate.  
Further, cooperatives’ members must have autonomy in conducting their work and must 
                                                 
28
 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2010  - Colombia,  Section 7, 
Washington, D.C., April 8, 2011; available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/wha/154499.htm.  
29
 Conclusions of the ILO High Level Tripartite Mission to Colombia, February 14-18, 2011, p. 4. 
30
 See e.g. the statement of Colombian Vice-President Angelino Garzon that “associated work cooperatives 
are the principal violators of labor rights.” November 4, 2010, Bogota; available from 
http://www.vicepresidencia.gov.co/Noticias/2010/Paginas/101104a.aspx. 
31
 Government of Colombia, Por la cual se expide la Ley de Formalización y Generación de Empleo, Ley 
1429 de 2010, as published in Diario Oficial, no. 47,937 (December 29, 2010) Article 63; available from 
http://www.secretariasenado.gov.co/senado/basedoc/ley/2010/ley_1429_2010.html. 
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share in the economic proceeds of the cooperative.  Cooperatives may not be involved in 
any form of labor intermediation.   
 
The Government of Colombia committed to develop and conduct an outreach program to 
inform and advise workers of their rights as members of CTAs, including the remedies 
and courses of action available to enforce recognition of a direct employment relationship 
when one is deemed to exist.  The initial phase of the outreach program began as of June 
15, 2011. 
 
To improve enforcement of laws governing cooperatives, the Colombian Government 
committed to hire and train 100 new inspectors dedicated exclusively to enforcing CTA 
laws, 50 of which are to be hired in 2011, with an additional 50 hired in 2012.  The 
Government has also committed to prioritize labor inspections, and the hiring of new 
inspectors, for those sectors in which employment relationships have been widely abused, 
including palm oil, sugar, mines, ports, and flowers. 
2.2  Collective Pacts 
 
There are two types of collective employment contracts under the Colombian Labor 
Code: collective conventions and collective pacts.  A collective convention is a contract 
negotiated with a duly formed union, and would be termed a collective bargaining 
agreement in the United States.  A collective pact is an agreement concluded by an 
employer with non-union workers.
32
   
 
Existing Law and Practice Governing Collective Pacts: Under Colombian law, 
collective pacts are legally permissible when a union represents one-third or less of a 
company’s workforce.33  When a union represents more than one third of a company’s 
workers, collective pacts are banned and any collective convention negotiated between 
the union and the employer covers all workers in the enterprise.
34
   
 
The Constitutional Court of Colombia has ruled that an employer’s freedom to enter into 
collective pacts “cannot be exercised or utilized by the employer to affect the 
fundamental rights of workers and the unions.”35  The Court has also declared that terms 
and conditions offered by employers through a collective pact must be the same as those 
offered to organized workers through collective bargaining.
36
   
 
Examining the situation in Colombia, the ILO CEACR has observed “that direct 
negotiations with workers should only be possible in the absence of trade union 
                                                 
32
 Government of Colombia, Código Sustantivo del Trabajo, Articles 467 and  481; available from 
http://www.secretariasenado.gov.co/senado/basedoc/codigo/codigo_sustantivo_trabajo.html#1. 
33
 Código Sustantivo del Trabajo, Article 481.  
34
 Código Sustantivo del Trabajo, Articles 481 and 471.  
35
 Constitutional Court Decision SU-342, Sec. IV(6), August 2, 1995; available from 
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/1995/SU342-95.htm. 
36
 Constitutional Court Decision, T-345, Sec. 4 (also citing prior holdings), May 10, 2007; available from 
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2007/T-345-07.htm. 
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organizations.”37  The CEACR has also raised concerns regarding the application of the 
law governing collective pacts in Colombia, referring “to enterprise, government and 
judicial practices giving preference to collective accords with non-unionized workers, 
disregarding collective agreements and existing trade unions.”38   
 
The ILO CFA has generally observed that “direct negotiation between the undertaking 
and its employees, by-passing representative organizations where these exist, might in 
certain cases be detrimental to the principle that negotiation between employers and 
organizations of workers should be encouraged and promoted.”39  The high-level ILO 
tripartite mission to Colombia in 2005 observed that union members were frequently 
encouraged by employers to drop their union affiliation and sign a collective pact 
instead.
40
    
The ILO CEACR has noted the low rate of collective bargaining in Colombia, citing a 
total of 256 collective conventions in 2008, covering only 1.2 percent of workers.
41
  
Colombian unionists have expressed concern over the increasing prevalence of collective 
pacts and what they perceive to be a corresponding decline in the number of workers 
covered by collective bargaining by unions.
42
  As of February 2011, there were 2,015 
collective pacts, covering 227,830 workers; 151 of the pacts, roughly 7.5 percent, 
covered workplaces where a union was also present.
43
   
Action Plan:  The Colombian Government submitted legislation to the Colombian 
Congress to establish criminal penalties, including imprisonment, for employers that 
undermine the right to organize and bargain collectively.  The reform was approved by 
Congress on June 1 of this year and was signed by President Santos on June 24, 2011.  It 
includes a provision making it a crime to offer a collective pact to non-union workers that 
has superior terms to those offered to union workers.  The penalties can include 
imprisonment of up to five years and fines of up to 500 times the minimum wage for 
certain conduct.
44
  Under the Action Plan, the Government had committed to seek 
enactment of this legislation by June 15, 2011, and upon passage of the legislation, to 
conduct a public outreach campaign to promote awareness of the law.  The Government 
has committed to implement a robust enforcement regime, including preventive 
                                                 
37
 International Labor Conference, 2004 Report of the CEACR, 60; available from 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc92/pdf/rep-iii-1a.pdf.  See also International Labor 
Conference, 2010 Report of the CEACR, 107; available from http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---
ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_123424.pdf.   
38
 International Labor Conference, 2004 Report of the CEACR, 60. 
39
 ILO CFA, Digest of Decisions, 2006, para. 945; available from 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/@normes/documents/publication/wcms_090632.pdf. 
40
 International Labor Conference, 2006 Report of the CEACR, 74; available from 
http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/P/09661/09661(2006)1A.pdf 
41
 International Labor Conference, 2010 Report of the CEACR, 107. 
42
 Tarsicio Mora Godoy, President of CUT Colombia, Speech to Trade Union Confederation (TUC) 
Congress, Sept. 10, 2008, available from https://www.tuc.org.uk/the_tuc/tuc-15338-f0.cfm.  
43
 Email from Official of MPS to US Embassy-Bogotá, April 11, 2011. 
44
 As of April 2011, the minimum wage was approximately $285 per month, resulting in a maximum fine 
of approximately $171,384.  U.S. Dept. of State, 2010 Human Rights Report: Colombia, April 8, 2011, sec. 
7(e) (citing a minimum wage of $285). 
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inspections, and to provide quarterly reports to interested parties. The Government is also 
requesting technical assistance from the ILO to monitor the use of collective pacts.  
2.3  Prohibitions on the Right to Strike 
The Labor Code bans strikes by employees in public services, defined as “all organized 
activity necessary to satisfy public welfare needs in a regular and continuous form, 
whether carried out by the State directly or indirectly, or by private persons.”45   The ILO 
CEACR has repeatedly commented that the services in which strikes are banned under 
Colombian law include “not only . . . essential services in the strict sense of the term 
[services the interruption of which would endanger the life, personal safety or health of 
the whole or part of the population] but also . . .  a wide range of services which are not 
necessarily essential” and in which, therefore, strikes should be permitted.46  Such non-
essential services in which strikes are banned include, for example, ground, air, and water 
transportation; telecommunications; social assistance establishments; all levels and 
branches of government; and the petroleum industry.
47
    
Until 2008, the salt sector was also identified under Colombian law as a public service in 
which strikes were banned.  In a 2008 ruling, however, the Constitutional Court declared 
the ban unconstitutional, citing the unitary nature of the Colombian legal system, which 
requires that the Labor Code comply with both the Constitution and ratified international 
conventions.
48
   Similarly, in 2009, the Supreme Court struck down the designation of rail 
transport of coal as an essential public service, based largely on the same reasoning 
followed by the Constitutional Court in 2008.
49
 
Action Plan:  The Government of Colombia has committed to collect the body of 
Colombian doctrine, case law and jurisprudence narrowing the definition of essential 
services and disseminate this information as well as relevant guidelines to labor 
inspectors, the judicial branch, unions and employers. 
2.4  Temporary Service Agencies  
 
Colombian law authorizes Temporary Service Agencies (Empresas de Servicios 
Temporales - ESTs) to serve as labor contractors to fulfill employer demands for 
temporary workers.
50
  The law includes provisions to prevent the use of ESTs to 
                                                 
45
 Código Sustantivo del Trabajo, Articles 430 and 450. 
46
 See e.g. International Labor Conference, 2005 Report of the CEACR, 50; available from  
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc93/pdf/rep-iii-1a.pdf. 
47
 See Código Sustantivo del Trabajo, Article 430.  For ILO commentary on strike prohibitions, see ILO 
CFA, Digest of Decisions, 2006, para. 587.   
48
 Constitutional Court Decision C-691, Section VII, para. 2, July 9, 2008; available from 
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2008/C-691-08.htm. 
49
 Supreme Court of Justice, Labour Cassation Court, Ruling No. 40428 (June 3, 2009), pp. 59 and 61; 
available from 
http://mps.minproteccionsocial.gov.co/vbecontent/library/documents/DocNewsNo14861DocumentNo1038
8.doc. 
50
Government of Colombia, Por la cual se introducen reformas al Código Sustantivo del Trabajo y se 
dictan otras disposiciones, Ley 50 de 1990 (December 28, 1990), as published in Diario Oficial, no. 39,618 
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undermine workers’ rights, including limits on the types of work that can be performed 
by ESTs and the number of times EST contracts can be renewed.  The use of ESTs has 
expanded in the Colombian labor market over recent years and enforcement of the law 
has reportedly been inconsistent.
51
 
 
EST workers are considered direct employees of the EST but not of the contracting third 
party employer.
52
  While workers’ rights to associate and bargaining collectively are 
protected with respect to the EST, these rights are not protected with respect to the third 
party employer.  In addition, as ESTs are hired only on a temporary basis, EST workers’ 
employment can be precarious, which can make them more vulnerable than permanent 
workers and less likely to exercise their rights to associate and bargain collectively.  The 
ILO CFA has expressed concern that contractors may use ESTs as a way to evade in 
practice the rights of workers to freedom of association and collective bargaining.
53
   
 
Existing Laws and Practice Governing ESTs:  Colombian law limits the contracting of 
temporary employees through ESTs to the following situations: 1) for occasional, 
unforeseen, or transitory work; 2) to substitute for personnel on vacation or on medical 
leave for illness or maternity; and 3) to address surges in production, transport or sales, in 
the periods of peak harvests and in the provision of services, for a period of no longer 
than six months, with the possibility of an extension for no more than an additional six 
months.
54
  The law also prohibits ESTs from providing workers to replace striking 
workers.
55
   
 
An employer may hire an EST to send workers to the employer’s worksite or to perform 
the work at facilities owned by the EST within the limits noted above.  (As noted above, 
Colombian law prohibits cooperatives from engaging in these functions that are permitted 
                                                                                                                                                 
(January 1, 1991), [hereinafter Ley 50 de 1990], Article 71; available from   
http://www.alcaldiabogota.gov.co/sisjur/normas/Norma1.jsp?i=281.  Law 50 forms an integral part of the 
Código Sustantivo del Trabajo.  See also Por el cual se reglamenta el ejercicio de la actividad de las 
empresas de servicios temporales y se dictan otras disposiciones, Decreto 4369 de 2006, as published in 
Diario Oficial no. 46,472 (December 4, 2006) [hereinafter Decreto 4369], Article 2 and 6; available from 
http://www.minproteccionsocial.gov.co/Normatividad/DECRETO%204369%20de%202006.pdf.     
51
 See Empresas ‘Piratas’ De Empleo Temporal Engañan A Desempleados, Caracol News Agency, 
[online], August 1, 2007; available from http://www.radiocaracol.com/nota.aspx?id=461367.  The 
Colombian Association of Temporary Service Agencies (ACOSET) estimates that by January of 2010, 
EST’s had grown by 5.22 percent over the previous year.  ACOSET, En Epoca de Recesión Aumenta El 
Empleo, 2010; available from http://www.aliadolaboral.com/personas/se4/BancoConocimiento/P/p-
empleo-empresas-temporales-aumento/p-empleo-empresas-temporales-aumento.aspx?CodSeccion=20.  
The MSP reports that at the end of 2009, there were at least 866,158 workers contracted by these agencies.  
151,884 were working directly on site for industrial employers, constituting 17.5 percent of the 
manufacturing sector labor force.  MSP, Oferta y Demanda de Mano de Obra en Empresas de Servicios 
Temporales en Colombia, 2009; available from:  www.minproteccionsocial.gov.co.  
52
 Ley 50 de 1990, Article 71.  See also Decree 4369 of 2006, Article 2. 
53
 See e.g. ILO CFA, Report 351, Nov. 19, 2008, para. 572; available from  
http://www.ilo.org/gb/GBSessions/lang--en/docName--WCMS_100625/index.htm.  See also ILO CFA, 
Digest of Decisions,  2006, paras. 255 and 906 for general ILO observation that temporary workers also 
have the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining.  
54
 Ley 50 de 1990, Article 77.  See also Decreto 4369 de 2006, Article 6. 
55
 Ley 50 de 1990, Article 89.  See also Decreto 4369 de 2006, Article 22.8.  
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for ESTs.)  When EST employees work on-site, the law requires that they be paid the 
same salary as permanent employees at the worksite performing the same work and must 
receive many of the same benefits, including those related to transportation, food and 
recreation.
56
  ESTs cannot provide services to third-party employers that have economic 
ties to the EST.
57
 
 
The MSP is responsible for enforcing Colombian laws governing Temporary Service 
Agencies, and the MSP must authorize ESTs to operate.
58
  The MSP is required to deny 
an EST operating authorization if any of its proprietors, administrators or legal 
representatives has been associated with another EST whose operating authorization was 
suspended or terminated for legal violations over the previous five years.
59
     
 
Where abuses of the EST laws are found, the MSP is charged with imposing fines on 
both the violating EST and the third-party employer.  MSP fines are authorized for up to 
100 monthly minimum wages for each violation,
60
 and repeated violations may result in 
suspension or cancellation of the EST authorization.
61
  
 
An insufficient number of labor inspectors has reportedly limited the capacity of the MSP 
to monitor and uncover illegal practices.
62
  Labor rights groups claim that fines imposed 
by the MSP against violating ESTs and third-party employers may be too low to dissuade 
potential violators.
63
  Some reports indicate that as many as 350,000 Colombian workers 
have been employed by unauthorized ESTs in recent years.
64
   
 
Action Plan:  In response to concerns that ESTs may be used unlawfully to circumvent 
labor rights, the Government of Colombia has committed to strengthen enforcement of 
Colombian laws governing ESTs.  The Government has committed to improve the 
inspection process, provide a new training program for labor inspectors on enforcement 
of EST-related laws and build databases to identify regions and sectors where there has 
been abuse.  The Government has also committed to create a monitoring and reporting 
mechanism through which interested parties can verify progress and compliance by ESTs 
with labor laws.  The MSP will issue quarterly reports that include the results of the 
measures taken to improve enforcement, such as preventative inspections, penalties, 
fines, cancellation of licenses and permits, and a list of ESTs found to be in violation.   
                                                 
56
 Decreto 4369 de 2006, Article 5.  See also Ley 50 de 1990, Article 77.  
57
 Ley 50 de 1990, Article 80.  See also Decreto 4369 de 2006, Article 22.7.  
58
 Ley 50 de 1990, Articles 82, 83 and  85. 
59
 Ley 50 de 1990, Article 90. 
60
 Decreto 4369 de 2006, Article 20.1.   
61
 Decreto 4369 de 2006, Articles 21 and 22. 
62
 ENS, Maneras y Atajos de las Cooperativas de Trabajo Asociado para Precarizar Condiciones 
Laborales.   
63
 The American Federation of Labor & Congress of Industrial Organizations, Comments Concerning the 
Pending Free Trade Agreement with Colombia, Sept. 15, 2009, p. 29; available from 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/afl-cio-comments-on-colombia-fta.pdf [hereinafter AFL-CIO 
Comments].  
64
 Empresas ‘Piratas’ De Empleo Temporal Engañan A Desempleados, Caracol News Agency. 
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2.5  Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining 
 
As noted above, the percentage of workers organized in trade unions has declined 
steadily in Colombia over recent decades.  In 2010, approximately 820,000 workers (4.4 
percent of the workforce of 18.4 million) were union members
65
.  According to the ILO, 
only 1.2 percent of the workforce was covered by a collective bargaining agreement in 
2008.
66
  The reasons for the decline in union membership and collective bargaining are 
numerous and varied, including some of the issues described above.  The High-level ILO 
Mission to Colombia in February 2011 expressed concern at the “repeated and detailed 
information it received concerning acts of anti-union discrimination at the enterprise level 
. . . as well as the failure to take effective action to stop it.”67 
 
Action Plan:  To address these concerns, the Government of Colombia submitted 
legislation to the Colombian Congress to establish criminal penalties, including 
imprisonment, for employers that undermine the right to organize and bargain 
collectively.  The reform was approved by Congress and signed byPresident Santos on 
June 24, 2011.  It establishes both fines and imprisonment for actions such as impeding 
or preventing workers from meeting, threatening reprisal for strikes or association, and 
offering a collective pact to non-union workers with better conditions than those offered 
to union workers.  The penalties can include imprisonment of up to five years and fines 
of up to 500 times the minimum wage, for certain conduct.   
2.6  Ministry of Labor 
 
In 2003, the Government of Colombia merged the Ministry of Labor and Social Security 
and the Ministry of Health to form the current Ministry of Social Protection (MSP).  
Since that time, the MSP Vice-Minister for Labor Affairs has overseen the three divisions 
of the Ministry that are responsible for labor policy development and implementation of 
Colombian labor laws.
68
  The three divisions are the General Directorate for Labor 
Protection, the General Directorate for Employment Promotion, and the Labor 
Inspectorate.  
 
Labor rights groups have asserted that the MSP is “markedly weaker” than its Ministry of 
Labor predecessors.
69
  The ILO’s CEACR has also articulated a number of specific 
concerns regarding the MSP's capacity to uphold internationally recognized workers' 
rights in Colombia.  These include concerns that mechanisms for notification to the labor 
inspectorate of industrial accidents and cases of occupational disease may be insufficient; 
that inspectors are tasked with too many responsibilities, interfering with the discharge of 
                                                 
65
 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2010  - Colombia,  Section 7, 
Washington, D.C., April 8, 2011.  
66
 International Labor Conference, 2010 Report of the CEACR, 107. 
67
 Conclusions of the ILO High Level Tripartite Mission to Colombia, February 14-18 2011, p. 4. 
68
 Government of Colombia, Por el cual se determinan los objetivos, la estructura orgánica y las funciones 
del Ministerio de la Protección Social y se dictan otras disposiciones, Decreto 205 de 2003, as published in 
Diario Oficial, no. 45.086 (February 3, 2003), Articles 27, 28, and 29; available from: 
http://www.secretariasenado.gov.co/senado/basedoc/decreto/2003/decreto_0205_2003.html.   
69
 AFL-CIO Comments, p.36. 
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their principal duties; and that initial inspector training and subsequent training during 
employment, including on risk assessment and workplace access, need strengthening.
70
  
Partly in response to such criticisms, the Government of Colombia introduced legislation, 
signed into law by President Santos on May 4, 2011, to reconstitute a separate Ministry 
of Labor.
71
   
 
Action Plan:  In addition to establishing a separate Ministry of Labor, the Government 
has committed to double the size of the labor inspectorate by hiring 480 new inspectors 
over a four-year period, with the hiring and training of the first 100 new inspectors to be 
completed in 2011.
72
  An additional 100 labor inspectors will be hired in 2012.  The 
Government has also committed to establish systems for filing anonymous labor 
complaints, including by creating a toll-free telephone hotline and a new web-based filing 
mechanism.  The Government has committed to improve and extend the mediation and 
conflict resolution system which has been operated by the MSP, including through 
workshops on alternative dispute resolution for labor inspectors and additional resources 
for regional offices, worker and employer conflict resolution trainings and outreach.  
2.7  Other Recent Labor Law Developments 
Determination of Legality of a Strike:  Prior to 2008, the Colombian Ministry of Social 
Protection was charged with determining the legality of a labor strike.  The ILO CEACR 
had commented “that a declaration of illegality of a strike should be made by the judicial 
authority or an independent authority, not by the Ministry of Labour.”73  In addition, the 
ILO CFA has observed generally that “responsibility for declaring a strike illegal should 
not lie with the government, but with an independent body which has the confidence of 
the parties involved.”74  Law No. 1210 of 2008 transferred the authority to rule on the 
legality of a strike to the judiciary by amending Article 451 of the Labor Code to provide 
                                                 
70
 International Labor Conference, 2011 Report of the CEACR, 517-518. 
71
 Embassy of Colombia, “Ensuring Justice and Protecting Labor and Human Rights in Colombia,” 
[online]; available from http://colombiaemb.org/docs/Colombia%20Kit/2010/11-16-10_I%20E%20-
%20Labor%20Rights%20and%20Impunity.pdf.   See also Informe de Conciliación al Proyecto de Ley 53 
de 2010 Camara, 166 de 2010 Senado. See also Colombia Reports, “Separation of Colombian Ministries 
Approved,” April 7, 2011 [online] available from: http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/news/15449-
separation-of-colombian-ministries-approved.html.  See also Colombia Reports, “Senate Approves Bill for 
New Government Powers,” March 16, 2011 [online] available from:  http://colombiareports.com/colombia-
news/news/14924-senate-approves-bill-for-new-government-powers.html.   
72
 See Action Plan, p. 1 supra note 3 at p. 1.  At the end of December 2006, the Inspectorate employed 274 
out of a possible 289 budgeted posts, MPS, “Citación e información necesaria para el informe sobre 
Derecho Laboral en Colombia” (Email communication attachment, September 21, 2007, U.S. Embassy-
Bogota), 1, 3, 5.  The U.S. State Department reported 423 labor inspectors in 2010. See U.S. Dept. of State, 
2010 Human Rights Report: Colombia, April 8, 2011, sec. 7(d). 
73
 ILO, CEACR, Individual Observation, Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, 
1948, Convention No. 87, Colombia (ratification: 1976) [online], 2000; available from 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-
lex/pdconv.pl?host=status01&textbase=iloeng&document=5067&chapter=6&query=Colombia%40ref&hig
hlight=&querytype=bool. 
74
 ILO CFA, Digest of Decisions, 2006, para. 628.  
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that “the legality or unlawful nature of a collective work suspension or stoppage shall be 
declared by the judicial authorities in a priority procedure.”75   
Registration of Trade Unions:  Prior to a Constitutional Court ruling in 2008, union 
registration procedures were administered by the MSP.  The procedures were reportedly 
very slow and official union recognition could sometimes take years.
76
  Labor rights 
groups additionally contended that the Government abused the requirements to slow or 
deny registration to new unions.
77
  The ILO CEACR noted that there were a high number 
of seemingly arbitrary rejections of union registration documents and called on the 
government to amend its laws to ensure that the administrative authority would not have 
undue discretion in the union registration process.
78
  However, Resolution No. 626 of 
2008, instead expanded the grounds on which the MSP could refuse to register a union to 
include “that the trade union organization has been established for purposes that are 
different from those deriving from the fundamental right of association.”79   
In a 2008 ruling, the Constitutional Court found the new grounds for denying union 
registration established in Resolution 626 to violate both the Constitution of Colombia 
and ILO Convention No. 87.
80
  The Court further ruled that the constitutional provisions 
requiring unions to register with the MSP served only as a pro forma registration 
requirement and did not justify the MSP in denying or approving a union’s registration 
documents.  The ruling removed a significant obstacle to union registration.      
In accordance with the Court’s ruling, the Government of Colombia has clarified that 
Resolution 626 of 2008 is inapplicable.  MSP officials are now depositing union 
documents in the register without the restrictive prior controls and procedures.
81
  Labor 
rights groups have confirmed that the MSP is largely following the new procedures for 
depositing union registration documents.
82
   
                                                 
75
 Government of Colombia, Por la cual se modifican parcialmente los artículos 448 numeral 4 y 451 del 
Código Sustantivo del Trabajo y 2 del Código Procesal del Trabajo y de la Seguridad Social y se crea el 
artículo 129A del Código Procesal del Trabajo y de la Seguridad Social y se dictan otras disposiciones, 
Ley 1210 de 2008, as published in Diario Oficial no. 47,050 (July 14, 2008)[hereinafter Ley 1210], Article 
2; available from http://www.secretariasenado.gov.co/senado/basedoc/ley/2008/ley_1210_2008.html.  
Section 1(2) of the Act empowered the President of the Republic to order the cessation of a strike if there 
was a prior favorable ruling of the Supreme Court.  The Constitutional Court declared that section of the act 
unconstitutional. Constitutional Court, C-349 (May 20, 2009), sec. III “Resuelve;” available from 
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2009/C-349-09.htm. 
76
 U.S. Department of State, 2004 Country Report on Human Rights Practices - Colombia, Feb. 28, 2005, 
Section 6a; available from http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41754.htm.   
77
 For example, in 2005, the World Confederation of Labor (WCL) and other unions asserted to the ILO 
CEACR that the Government rejected registrations at the behest of employers.  International Labor 
Conference, 2005 Report of the CEACR, 51.   
78
 See International Labor Conference, 2008 Report of the CEACR, 96; available from 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_090991.pdf.  
79
 Government of Colombia, Por la cual se deroga la Resolución 1651 de 2007 y se modifican los artículos 
2°, 3° y 5° de la Resolución 01875 de 2002, Resolución 626 de 2008, as published in Diario Oficial no. 
46,914 (Feb. 26, 2008), Article 2; available from 
http://mps.minproteccionsocial.gov.co/vbecontent/VerImp.asp?ID=17501&IDCompany=3. 
80
 See Constitutional Court, C-695 (July 9, 2008), sec. VI, para. 22; available from 
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2008/C-695-08.htm.   
81
 International Labor Conference, 2010 Report of the CEACR, 104.  
82
 See e.g., AFL-CIO Comments, pp. 22-23. 
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Compulsory Arbitration: Between 1990 and 2008, Article 448(4) of the Colombian 
Labor Code allowed the Ministry of Labor (and then its successor MSP) to refer a dispute 
to an arbitration tribunal when a strike lasted for more than 60 calendar days.
83
  The ILO 
CEACR repeatedly expressed concern that this provision was contrary to international 
standards on freedom of association.
84
  The ILO CFA explicitly requested the 
Government of Colombia to take steps to amend Article 448 to provide that compulsory 
arbitration to end a collective labor dispute and a strike is acceptable only at the request 
of both parties involved in the dispute; if the strike involves public servants exercising 
authority in the name of the State; or if the strike affects essential services.
85
 
 
Law No. 1210 of 2008, discussed above, amended Labor Code Article 448(4).  The 
amended section now states that, following a mandatory five-day conciliation period, 
“both parties shall request” the MPS to convene an arbitration board.86  The Government 
of Colombia has subsequently clarified that such a request must be made voluntarily by 
both parties and therefore does not provide for compulsory arbitration.
87
 
                                                 
83
 See Ley 50 de 1990, Article 63(4)(repealed by Ley 1210 of 2008, Article 1).  See also ILO CFA, Report 
314 (March 1999), paras. 68, 69, and 75; available from  
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb274/gb-8-2.htm. 
84
 See, e.g., ILO CEACR, Individual Observation, Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
Organize, 1948, Colombia (ratification: 1976)[online], 1991; available from http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-
lex/pdconv.pl?host=status01&textbase=iloeng&document=830&chapter=6&query=Colombia%40ref&high
light=&querytype=bool.  
85
 ILO CFA, Report 314, paras. 75 and 77(c).  See also ILO CFA, Digest of Decisions, 2006, paras. 565-
567. 
86
 Código Sustantivo del Trabajo,  Article 448(4). 
87
 See International Labor Conference, 2010 Report of the CEACR, 105.  The CEACR observed that this 
interpretation was also confirmed to the High Level ILO mission, which visited Colombia in October 2009.  
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3.  Labor Violence and Impunity 
 
This section describes concerns about violence against trade unionists and prosecution of 
the perpetrators and recent commitments made and steps taken by the Government of 
Colombia to address the issue.  It provides an overview on violence levels; examines 
issues of justice and impunity, including investigations, prosecutions, convictions, 
sentencing, and victims’ rights; and describes current and newly launched efforts to 
protect at-risk union members. 
 
The administration of Colombian President Santos has publicly recognized the significant 
problem of anti-union violence and impunity.
88
  Under the Action Plan of April 7, 2011, 
the Government of Colombia committed to take substantial and concrete measures to 
address the problem, discussed below.  
3.1  Recent History of Violence 
 
Historically, there has been “an extremely serious problem of violence [against trade 
unionists] in Colombia,”89 largely perpetrated by illegally armed groups.  This has 
occurred in the context of a long history of violent conflict in Colombia, which surged 
with great intensity from the mid-1980s, with armed confrontations between 
revolutionary guerrillas and newly created paramilitary organizations, funded by the 
proceeds of illicit drug production and trafficking.  Trade unionists, along with other 
social and political leaders, became the targets of violence committed by these armed 
groups.
90
  
 
The levels of violence in general and labor violence in Colombia have fallen substantially 
since 2005.
91
  According to the Escuela Nacional Sindical (ENS),
92
 although there was a 
significant drop in the murder of Colombian trade unionists from 2002 to 2007, falling 
from 191 to 39 per year, murders have increased again during the last three years, with 52 
murders in 2008, 47 in 2009, and 51 in 2010.
93
  According to the Colombian 
                                                 
88
 “Frente para erradicar crimines de sindicalistas, propone A. Garzón”, El Tiempo, Bogota,  January 24, 
2011, http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/estados-unidos/ARTICULO-WEB-NEW_NOTA_INTERIOR-
8796317.html.  
89
 ILO CFA, Report 343(November 16, 2006), para. 418; available from 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_gb_297_10_en.pdf.  
90
 Fernan E. Gonzalez, “The Colombian Conflict in Historic Perspective”, Conciliation Resources, 2004, 
http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/colombia/historical-perspective.php. 
91
 Conclusions of the ILO High-Level Tripartite Mission to Colombia, February 14-18, 2011, p. 2.  
92
 The ENS was founded in Medellin in 1982, and is a labor research center consisting of academics, 
lawyers, economists and professional researchers, who investigate and publish widely on every aspect of 
Colombian labor relations, labor law, and Colombian compliance with international labor standards. 
93
 ENS, “Violencia antisindical e impunidad durante los 8 años del Gobierno Uribe”, 2010, 
www.uniglobalunion.org/.../Balance%20Gobieerno%20Uribe.%20Violencia%20antisindical%20e%20imp
unidad.Textos%ENS; E NS, “En 2010 fueron asesinados 51 sindicalistas en Colombia”, 2010, 
www.ddhh_colombia.org/.../noticias%20sindicales/informeescuela11032011.PDG.  
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Government, the number of murders of trade unionists was 26 in 2007, 39 in 2008 and 28 
in 2009.
94
   
 
According to the ENS, forms of violence against trade unionists other than murder have 
been rising.
95
  The ENS reports that in 2010 there were seven cases of forced 
disappearances, 21 assassination attempts, 35 forced displacements, five kidnappings, 
three arbitrary detentions and 338 death threats against trade unionists.
96
   
3.2  Investigations, Prosecutions, Convictions, and Sentencing 
 
Colombian Government sources indicate 353 convictions in cases involving the murder 
of trade unionists over the last 25 years.
97
  According to the ENS, in 95.6 percent of cases 
involving the murder of trade unionists since 1986, there have been no convictions.
98
  
The ILO described the “situation of impunity” as “intolerable” in 2002.99   
 
In response to the continued problem of labor violence and few convictions of 
perpetrators, in 2006 the Colombian Prosecutor General’s Office established a Labor 
Sub-Unit of the Human Rights Unit, devoted exclusively to the investigation and 
prosecution of violent acts committed against trade unionists.  That year, the Government 
of Colombia also designated three special judges from the existing criminal justice 
system to rule on criminal cases involving anti-union violence.
100
  Although there has 
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 Ministerio de la Protección Social y Fiscalía General de la Nación (Prosecutor General), Colombia: Un 
pais comprometido con la actividad sindical y el cumplimiento de estándares laborales internacionales, 
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96
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been an increase in convictions since 2006, most murders and other cases of violence 
against trade unionists remain unsolved.  In addition, few cases of non-lethal violence, 
including death threats, are effectively investigated.
101
   
 
The ILO’s supervisory bodies have found a direct connection between violence against 
trade unionists and violation of workers’ right to freedom of association and collective 
bargaining.  The ILO CFA has stated that “[a] genuinely free and independent trade 
union movement cannot develop in a climate of violence and uncertainty” and has further 
noted that “[a] climate of violence, such as that surrounding the murder or disappearance 
of trade union leaders, . . . constitutes a serious obstacle to the exercise of trade union 
rights.”  The ILO CFA has held that “such acts require severe measures to be taken by the 
authorities,”102 and has also noted: 
 
In the event that judicial investigations into the murder and disappearance of trade 
unionists are rarely successful, the Committee has considered it indispensable that 
measures be taken to identify, bring to trial and convict the guilty parties and has 
pointed out that such a situation means that, in practice, the guilty parties enjoy 
impunity which reinforces the climate of violence and insecurity and thus has an 
extremely damaging effect on the exercise of trade union rights.
103
 
 
In March 2009 in a case concerning Colombia, the ILO CFA reiterated these conclusions 
and emphasized the Colombian government’s responsibility to end the violence and 
impunity.
104
  In February 2011, an ILO High Level Tripartite Mission to Colombia 
similarly stated that “ending impunity is the strongest deterrent to acts of violence in the 
future.”105 
 
In the cases where convictions were obtained, there have been concerns expressed about 
the investigative methodology used to obtain them, including failure to fully explore 
possible anti-union motive; failure to investigate potential intellectual authors, in 
particular in cases involving plea bargains and confessions; and failure to examine similar 
cases together as a pattern.
106
  In approximately 34 percent of labor violence cases, the 
defendants were convicted in absentia and are therefore still at large.
107
  A Colombian 
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Commission of Jurists (CCJ)
 
study that examined 150 cases of anti-union violence from 
2002 to 2008
108
 found that in only ten percent of the cases had a full examination been 
conducted of the victim’s union activity and the possible relevancy of that activity to the 
crime at issue.
109
   
 
A number of factors contribute to the shortfalls in the number and quality of convictions 
obtained, including resource and staffing shortages for the Prosecutor General’s Office; 
inadequate training for judicial police, who generally are the first at the scene of union 
homicides; and lack of internal coordination between units working on such cases.  
 
Of the 2,857 murders of trade unionists since 1986 reported by the ENS, 1,387 have been 
assigned to the special Labor Rights Sub-Unit.
110
  The status of the unassigned cases 
remains unclear.  Reportedly, of the assigned cases, about 1,150 are actively under 
investigation or prosecution; most are still in the preliminary stage of investigation, 
meaning there is no identification of suspects.  There are no criminal files in 194 cases, 
indicating that investigations have not yet been launched.
111
  The Prosecutor General’s 
Office moved forward with indictments and prosecutions in 12.3 percent of the 1,150 
cases according to the ENS and CCJ.
112
  As noted above, the Colombian Government has 
reported 353 convictions in cases involving the assassination of trade unionists over the 
last 25 years.
113
 
 
In order to address the large number of unresolved cases, in 2006 the Government of 
Colombia and the three national trade union centrals, with the assistance of the ILO, 
identified 185 priority cases of trade unionist murders.
114
  Of those, about half are still in 
the first stage of investigation, without suspects having been identified.  Final rulings 
have been issued in 22.7 percent of the priority cases.
115
   
 
There are a number of factors that contribute to the lack of prosecutions.  The Prosecutor 
General’s Office lacks sufficient staff and resources and, in particular, faces a shortage of 
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prosecutors, investigators, and judicial police, especially at the regional level.
116
  During 
an ILO 2009 mission to Colombia, the Colombian Government acknowledged 
insufficient resources for the Prosecutor General’s Office, specifically citing the Labor 
Rights Sub-Unit.
117
  In addition, the judicial police lack sufficient training on crime scene 
management, preservation of evidence and other investigative techniques necessary to 
facilitate effective and successful investigations and prosecutions in cases of labor 
violence.   
 
There is also a lack of coordination within the Labor Rights Sub-Unit and between the 
Labor Rights Sub-Unit and the Justice and Peace Sub-Unit of the Prosecutor General’s 
Office.  As a result, cases involving the same regions, industrial sectors, or unions are not 
being sufficiently investigated together, impeding detection of similarities that could 
assist in identifying possible anti-union motives and related perpetrators, including 
intellectual authors, across cases.  For example, in 2009, there were convictions in seven 
cases involving assassination of trade unionists in the health care industry.  Three of the 
cases involved murders on the Caribbean coast (Barranquilla and Santa Marta), but 
neither the National Police nor the Prosecutor General’s Office investigated the possible 
relationship between these assassinations, although all occurred after the victims tried to 
fight the privatization of their hospitals.
118
  According to the Inter-American Court on 
Human Rights, a systematic and contextual method of investigation and prosecution is 
essential to combating impunity in Colombia.
119
  
 
A substantial number of the convictions in cases of trade unionist murders are the result 
of the application of the 2005 Justice and Peace Law, which has served as a legal 
framework for the demobilization of paramilitary groups and is largely administered by 
the Justice and Peace Sub-Unit of the Prosecutor General’s Office.120  This law offers 
reduced prison sentences of five to eight years to members of armed groups who agree to 
demobilize and confess all their crimes, including violent acts against trade unionists.
121
  
Although the Justice and Peace process has helped secure convictions, the paramilitary 
confessions are often general and fail to identify other accomplices or the specific 
circumstances of the crimes, resulting in convictions based on voluntary statements rather 
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than independent investigations that might lead to other intellectual or material authors 
and a more complete understanding of the cases.
122
  
3.3  Recent Developments and Action Plan  
 
In recognition of the serious, ongoing problems of labor violence and impunity, in 2009 
the Colombian Government passed Law 1309, which increased penalties and promoted 
improved prosecutions in cases of labor violence.  Law 1309 expanded the category of 
crimes requiring a minimum sentence of 40 years to include violent crimes against union 
members.  The law also expanded the category of aggravated threats to include threats 
against union members, thereby increasing potential prison terms for the convicted 
perpetrators of such threats.  The law also increased from 20 to 30 years the statute of 
limitations in cases of union-related assassinations.
123
   
 
Under the Action Plan, the Government of Colombia has made and is in the process of 
implementing a series of important commitments to protect trade union activists and 
threatened teachers and to address concerns related to the investigation and prosecution 
of labor violence cases, described below in 3.3.2.  
3.3.1  Protection of Threatened Trade Union Activists and Teachers 
 
The Colombian Ministry of Interior and Justice (MIJ) has maintained a protection 
program for human rights advocates, including trade unionists, since 1997.
124
  There are 
two major criteria for eligibility: the existence of imminent risk of violence against the 
life, integrity, security or liberty of the trade unionist; and that the trade unionist be a 
leader of his or her labor organization or a trade union activist.
125
  In practice, the 
Government has limited the program to leaders and executive board members of unions.  
As of 2010, the program covered 1,454 unionists, constituting 13.5 percent of protection 
program participants.
126
  Separate protection regimes are offered for workers in the 
petroleum sector (United Workers Union) and teachers (Colombian Federation of 
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Educators), because trade unionists in these sectors have been subject to higher levels of 
violence.
127
  
  
The MIJ regime provides two kinds of protection for trade union participants, depending 
on the results of a risk assessment conducted by the National Police: soft measures, 
including access to communication equipment, such as cell phones, occasional transit to 
minimize danger and temporary relocations; and hard measures, including bodyguards, 
bullet-proof vests, armored vehicles and relocation out of the country, either temporary or 
long-term.
128
 
 
Two of Colombia’s three national labor centrals, the Unitary Central of Workers (CUT) 
and CTC (Confederation of Colombian Workers), have raised concerns about the MIJ 
protection program.  They have noted that while over 75 percent of the victims of labor 
violence have been rank and file members engaging in union activity or workers 
attempting to organize into unions, the MIJ program has been limited, in practice, to 
union leaders.  The CUT and the CTC have also criticized the risk assessments performed 
by the National Police for requiring a clearly articulated and proven threat of death or 
severe bodily harm, which is lacking in most cases, prior to designation of an 
“extraordinary risk” which is required for protection program eligibility.129  They claim 
that National Police risk assessments often do not take into consideration relevant 
community-specific and region-specific circumstances.
130
  The two labor centrals have 
also raised concerns that the initial risk assessments on which protection program 
eligibility is based suffer from chronic delays and backlogs.  Although Colombian law 
requires the National Police to make a risk determination within 30 days,
131
 deliberations 
often last for months.
132
  In March 2011, the MIJ was informed by the National Police 
that the assessment backlog totaled 1,040 cases, 304 of which were applications for 
protection by trade unionists.
133
   
 
Teachers have been particular targets of violence.  Of the total number of trade union 
murders from 1986 to the present, one-third (946) have been leaders or members of the 
Colombian Federation of Educators (FECODE).
134
  The Government of Colombia 
instituted a system of special protection measures for teachers in 1992.
135
  Between 1992 
and 2010, if a teacher reported to the relevant local Ministry of Education that he or she 
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had received threats of violence and presented appropriate documentation, the teacher 
would be automatically transferred to another school district while the threat was 
evaluated, and permanently thereafter if the threat was confirmed.
136
  In 2010, however, 
the Ministry of Education changed the protection program significantly.
137 
 Under 
Resolution 1240 of 2010, a teacher alleging threats of violence would be provisionally 
transferred for two months, pending completion of the risk assessment.  If it was 
determined that the teacher faced “ordinary risk” rather than “extraordinary risk”, the 
teacher would be returned to his or her home district and denied salary for the period of 
transfer.
138  
FECODE expressed serious concern about the change, arguing that it put 
teachers at greater risk because they could not afford to face the potential financial 
hardship of denial of compensation.   
 
Action Plan:  In response to these concerns, the Government of Colombia has committed 
to and has begun to take a series of specific steps to improve the protection program for 
union activists.  In April 2011, the MIJ issued Ministerial Resolution 716 of 2011, 
broadening the scope of the protection program to cover all labor activists, including 
those engaged in advocating for worker rights at the workplace level and workers 
engaged in active efforts to form a union.  The Resolution also extends coverage to 
former union leaders and activists who are determined to be under extraordinary risk 
because of their past union activities. The Government of Colombia has committed to 
plan and budget for the additional resources necessary to support the resulting expansion 
of the protection program and to consult with the relevant unions to verify the status of 
the individuals seeking protection.   
 
With regard to the teacher protection program, the Government of Colombia has 
amended the program to eliminate any pecuniary sanctions against teachers who are 
transferred provisionally under the program, but later found not to be under extraordinary 
risk.   
  
Under the Action Plan, the Government launched an emergency effort to eliminate the 
backlog of risk assessments with respect to applications for protection filed by union 
members, which it completed by July 30, 2011.  The Government has committed to 
henceforth comply with the legal requirement to process all risk assessments within a 30-
day period. 
 
The Government of Colombia has implemented a commitment to reform the scope and 
functioning of the interagency advisory committee on protection and risk assessments by 
September 15, 2011. The committee is being reconstituted to include not only 
representatives of the National Police but also the Inspector General’s Office and the 
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Public Defender’s Office to broaden the expertise and perspectives that are brought to the 
task. 
3.3.2  Investigation and Prosecution of Labor Violence Cases 
 
Action Plan:  In April 2011, the Prosecutor General’s Office issued a directive to 
regional directors of prosecutors, to the national prosecutorial units and to the National 
Directorate of the Technical Investigative Body (CTI)
139
 instructing them that in all 
murder cases, they must immediately report the victim’s identity to headquarters in order 
to: check union affiliation status with the MSP; and take all urgent actions necessary to 
determine the motive for the murder and, specifically, any relationship between the 
victim’s status as a union member and the violence committed.140  In April 2011, the 
Prosecutor General’s Office also issued a directive to the chiefs of the Units of Justice 
and Peace and Human Rights, directing them to more effectively share evidence and 
information about cases involving labor violence.
141
   
 
Under the Action Plan, the Government of Colombia committed to assign an additional 
95 National Police as full-time judicial police investigators dedicated exclusively to cases 
of labor violence.  In April 2011, the Government assigned 100 National Police to those 
responsibilities in fulfillment of the Action Plan commitment.  The Prosecutor General’s 
Office will develop a plan and identify specific budgetary needs to strengthen the 
institutional capabilities and the number of prosecutors and judicial police investigators 
assigned to process labor cases in the regional office based on an assessment of structural 
weaknesses or lack of sufficient resources.  The Colombian Government has also 
committed to seek funding for the plan in the 2012 budget.  
 
The Prosecutor General’s Office has also committed to work to enhance the training of 
judicial police investigators and prosecutors on crime scene management, as well as 
jointly training them in investigative techniques with specific reference to the issues 
involved in cases of violence against trade unionists.  The Office has drafted an analysis 
of closed cases of homicides of union members and activists in order to extract lessons 
that can be used to improve the guidelines and protocols for effectively investigating and 
prosecuting future cases.  The Office will make the analysis public as soon as it is 
finalized. 
 
The Prosecutor General’s Office has also committed to meet with union confederations 
and the ENS to reconcile discrepancies between databases on unionist homicide cases 
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and will provide guidance to prosecutors to accelerate action on those cases with leads 
and to provisionally close cold cases. 
3.3.3  Victims’ Rights 
 
Lack of reparation for victims of labor violence and their families and a lack of 
transparency regarding investigations, prosecutions, and convictions in labor violence 
cases have been significant concerns, particularly for labor rights groups.
142
  Victims and 
their families have reported finding it difficult to obtain information on the status of labor 
violence investigations and prosecutions, including procedural posture of the cases, 
evidence of anti-union motive, formal charges and arrests.  Once such cases have been 
concluded, victims, their families and trade unions have been able to obtain only limited 
information.  They have had difficulty in ascertaining critical details about the role of 
convicted perpetrators, whether convictions were obtained in absentia, and whether 
sentences were imposed and enforced.
143
   
 
On June 10, 2011, President Santos signed into law the Victims and Land Restitution 
Law.  The law offers reparations to victims of violence due to the internal armed conflict, 
which would include individual trade unionists and their families, and provides for 
restitution of land to families displaced due to the internal armed conflict.  The law 
provides a broad definition of victims and is intended to include victims of state agents; 
calls for special guarantees and protection measures, within the framework of assistance 
and reparations, for those considered to be “at greater risk,” defined to include union 
members and other specific categories of victims; inverts the burden of proof in land 
restitution cases in favor of displaced victims; and creates expedited channels for 
restitution.
144
  
 
Action Plan:  The Government of Colombia has committed to take additional measures 
for victims of labor violence.  Under the Action Plan, the Prosecutor General’s Office 
will establish victims’ assistance centers specializing in human rights cases, including 
labor cases.  The centers will be staffed by professionals with expertise on human rights 
and labor issues.  The Prosecutor General’s Office will direct these centers and authorize 
them to share information with the victims and their families about the status of their 
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cases, as well as provide legal and psychological support.  The Prosecutor General’s 
Office will also improve public reporting with respect to closed cases. 
 
 
 
 
